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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
RICHARD WILLIAM VERHOEF and 
DELORES A. VERHOEF, husband 
and wife, JACK MICHAEL DEALBA 
and EMMA DEALBA, husband and 
wife, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants. 
-vs-
GERARD R. ASTON and SHARON 
L. ASTON, husband and wife, 
et al, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
Supreme Court No. 20,197 
DEFENDANTS'AND RESPONDENTS1 BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action wherein Plaintiffs-Appellants entered 
into a Uniform Real Estate Contract with Defendants-Respondents 
Aston, which required Plaintiffs to refinance the first mortgage 
after two years. Plaintiffs did not refinance, and instead ins-
tituted this suit, claiming under various theories of reformation, 
unilateral mistake, fraud, inequitable conduct, unauthorized 
practice of law, breach of escrow duties, negligence, willful 
and wanton conduct, specific performance and estoppal, that they 
were entitled to reform the contract. Defendants asserted in 
their Counterclaim that Plaintiffs had breached the contract 
by failing to refinance. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Motions for Summary Judgment were filed by all Defendants, 
and a pre-trial conference was held prior to trial, wherein the 
Court found that certain issues of fact were in dispute which 
should be reserved for trial. The trial Court identified these 
issues as follows: 
The issue of whether the conduct of any 
of the Defendants constitutes fraud, thus 
overcoming the merger of the provisions of 
the Earnest Money Agreement into the writings 
reflected in the final agreement between 
the parties (See Exhibit "A" - March 20, 
1984 Minute Entry). 
Trial was held on May 21 and May 22, 1984, and again on 
July 5, 1984, Judge David Sam presiding. The trial Court found 
that Plaintiffs had failed to sustain their burden of proof, 
that the Uniform Real Estate Contract was clear, unambiguous, 
and binding between the parties, and that all causes of action 
asserted by Plaintiffs should be dismissed. 
Upon considering Defendants' Counterclaim, the trial Court 
found that Plaintiffs had breached the Uniform Real Estate Contract 
by failing to refinance according to the terms thereof, and that 
Defendants were entitled to judgment in the sum of $79,987.04 
plus interest, attorney's fees and costs in the sum of $3,015.00 
plus interest. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendants seek an order of this Court confirming the judgment 
granted below. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On November 25, 1980, Plaintiffs Richard William Verhoef, 
Delores A. Verhoef, Jack Michael DeAlba and Emma DeAlba executed 
a Uniform Real Estate Contract with Defendants Gerard Aston and 
Sharon Aston, wherein Plaintiffs purchased the home of Defendants 
(Plaintifffs Exhibit No. 2). 
The Contract provided for: 
(a) A purchase price of $78,000.00. 
(b) A cash payment to Defendants of $10,163.32. 
(c) Establishment of an Escrow Account of 
$9,836.68 to supplement Plaintiff's monthly 
payments for two years until the property 
was to be refinanced, (d) an underlying first 
mortgage obligation in the sum of $67,853.82 
(Page 187 - Record on Appeal). 
Said Contract required the Plaintiffs to refinance the entire 
unpaid balance on or before December 1, 1982 (See Plaintiff's 
Exhibit No. 2). 
Plaintiffs stipulated that they did not refinance the property 
as required by the Contract (Page 236 - Record on Appeal). Trial 
was conducted by the lower Court on May 21, May 22, and July 
5, 1984. The additional trial day of July 5, 1984 was allowed 
because the Court approved an amendment to the Counterclaim which 
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added Jack and Emma DeAlba as Counterclaim Defendants (Page 224-233, 
152-157 - Record on Appeal), 
After considering the evidence, the Court found that Plaintiffs 
had failed to establish a cause of action, that they had breached 
the contract, and that Defendants Aston were entitled to judgment 
(See Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law - Exhibit "B"). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Plaintiffs did not sustain their burden of proof, failed 
to prove fraud, and failed to comply with the requirements of 
Thompson v. Smith 620 P2d 520 (1980) pertaining to the reformation 
of contracts. The evidence did sustain the Court's finding that 
Defendants were entitled to judgment on their Counterclaim. 
The amendment to the pleadings, adding the DeAlbas as Counterclaim 
Defendants, was proper under Rule 15, U.R.C.P., and under the 
requirements of Lewis v. Moultree 627 P2d 94 (1981), 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE FINDINGS AND JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL COUET WERE SUP-
PORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
After considering various pre-trial Motions, the trial Court 
narrowed the issues for consideration to the following: 
...whether the conduct of any of the other 
Defendants constitutes fraud, thus overcoming 
the merger of the provisions of the Earnest 
Money Agreement into the writings reflected 
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in the final agreement between the parties 
(See Minute Entry dated March 20, 1984 -
Exhibit "A"). 
At the conclusion of Plaintiffs1 case, Defendants moved 
to dismiss on the basis that there had been no proof to support 
an allegation of fraud against Defendants. The record shows 
the following: 
MR. HARRISON: Your Honor, I would ask the 
Court to review again its Minute Entry of 
March 20 of this year, the most recent Minute 
Entry wherein the Court ruled that the issue 
of whether the conduct of any of the Defendants 
constituted fraud. 
THE COURT: Well, I am ready to rule on that, 
counsel. 
MR. HARRISON: I would like to make a Motion 
at this time that Plaintiffs' Complaint be 
dismissed for no cause of action. There 
has been no allegation, no testimony, as 
to any acts on behalf of the Defendants Aston 
which in any way constitutes fraud. There 
has been virtually no contact. 
THE COURT: I so find that no scintilla of 
proof of fraud on the part of Astons, the 
Court so finds, anything else? (Page 223-
Record on Appeal) 
Plaintiffs' First Cause of Action was based upon a theory 
of reformation. The general rule as stated in the case of Thompson 
v. Smith 620 P2d 520 (1980) is as follows: 
There are two basic grounds for the reformation 
of written instruments which do not correctly 
state and embody the intention and pre-existing 
agreement of the parties to the instrument, 
namely (1) mutual mistake of the parties 
and (2) ignorance or mistake of the complaining 
party coupled with or induced by the fraud 
or inequitable conduct of the other remaining 
parties. 
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The testimony at trial was quite clear, that the mistake, 
if any, was a unilateral mistake. The trial Court ruled that 
the elements of fraud had not been established. As a result, 
Plaintiffs were not entitled to reform the contract. 
Plaintiffs1 Second Cause of Action was based upon a theory 
of unilateral mistake. The general rule of law pertaining to 
unilateral mistake is set forth as follows: 
Indeed, when no question of fraud, bad faith 
or inequitable conduct is involved, and the 
right to reform an instrument is based solely 
on a mistake, it is necessary that the mistake 
be mutual, and that both parties understood 
the contract as the Complaint or Petition 
alleges it ought to have been, and as it 
was except for the mistake...unilateral mistake 
is not a ground for reformation (66 Am Jur 
2d Sec. 22, Page 550 - Reformation of Instru-
ments) . 
Plaintiffs asserted fraud as a basis for unilateral mistake, 
but failed to establish the same at trial. Plaintiffs' Fifth 
and Sixth Causes of Action were the only remaining allegations 
that related to the Defendants Aston. These causes of action 
were based upon theories of specific performance and estoppal. 
Specific performance could only occur if the trial Court 
found that a reformation of contract was appropriate. Since 
Plaintiffs failed to establish fraud, no reformation was allowed, 
and specific performance was not applicable. 
Estoppal also failed because Plaintiffs failed to establish 
the elements of fraud. 
Defendants asserted in their Counterclaim simply a breach 
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of contract. Under the Uniform Real Estate Contract, Plaintiffs 
were required to refinance the entire unpaid balance on or before 
December 1, 1982. This they failed to do. As a result of their 
breach of contract, the first mortgage holder instituted a fore-
closure action. Damages sustained by Defendants Aston as a result 
of the foreclosure action, as stipulated by the parties, amounted 
to the sum of $79,987.04 plus attorney's fees and Court costs 
of $3,015.00. 
The testimony at trial indicated that Plaintiffs paid 
$20,000.00 at closing, approximately $10,000.00 of which represented 
the equity of Defendants Aston, and approximately $10,000.00 
of which was placed in an escrow account to supplement the Plain-
tiffs1 payments for a period of two years. The escrow account 
money was used by Plaintiffs to supplement their monthly payments. 
The underlying mortgage balance of $67,853.82 was not refinanced 
as required under the contract, and judgment was entered accor-
dingly. 
POINT II. THE AMENDMENT TO THE PLEADINGS WAS WITHIN THE SOUND 
DISCRETION OF THE TRIAL COURT. 
The original parties which instituted this action as Plaintiffs 
were Richard and Delores Verhoef and Jack and Emma DeAlba. Defen-
dants Aston filed an Answer and Counterclaim. Counsel for Plain-
tiffs filed a Reply to the Counterclaim on October 14, 1983, 
wherein he replied to the allegations of the Counterclaim on 
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behalf of all Plaintiffs (See Page 39 - Record on Appeal). 
Counsel for Defendants Aston discovered while preparing 
for trial/ that the Counterclaim had inadvertently stated only 
two of the four Plaintiffs as Counterclaim Defendants, and therefore 
requested leave to amend the pleadings. 
The allegations were the same, the facts were the same, 
the parties to be added were the Co-Plaintiffs, Jack and Emma 
DeAlba, for whom a reply to the Counterclaim had already been 
filed. 
The Motion was made before the commencement, of trial on 
the Counterclaim. 
Rule 15, U.C.R.P. provides in part: 
...A party may amend his pleadings only by 
leave of Court or by written consent of the 
adverse party; and leave shall be freely 
given when justice so requires. 
In the recent case of Lewis v. Moultree 627 P2d 94 (1981), 
the Court stated: 
A prime consideration in determining whether 
an amendment should be permitted is the adequacy 
of an opportunity for the opposing party 
to meet the newly raised matter. 
In Thomas J. Peck & Sons, Inc. v. Lee Rock 
Products, this Court stated the matter as 
follows: 
Some tempest has been raised about the Court 
allowing the Plaintiff to make tardy amendments 
to the pleadings. In doing so, he (the trial 
Judge) wisely and properly stated: The plead-
ings are never more important than the cause 
that is before the Court...there can be no 
prejudice in this case because we will give 
ample time for any answer... this is in harmony 
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with what we regard as the correct policy 
of recognizing the desirability of the pleadings 
setting forth definitely framed issues, but 
of also permitting amendment where the interest 
of justice so requires, and the adverse party 
is given a fair opportunity to meet it. 
In the instant case, the trial Court allowed the amendment, 
stating that the parties were already before the Court, and granted 
time to Plaintiffs to respond (Page 226 - Record on Appeal, Page 
3 - Exhibit "C", and Exhibit "D"). The Court further stated: 
I am not going to allow any ruling of this 
Court to apply to them until Mr. Clark has 
an opportunity to contact them and be prepared 
to present anything he wishes in their behalf 
(Page 227 - Record on Appeal). 
The trial Court allowed the amendment on May 22, 1984 and 
specifically continued the trial until July 5, 1984 in order 
to allow Plaintiffs DeAlba to present additional evidence which 
they deemed necessary in defending against the Counterclaim. 
The position of the Plaintiffs Verhoefs and the Plaintiffs DeAlbas 
was precisely the same. 
When trial was resumed on July 5, 1984, the parties and 
the Court agreed that the purpose of the continuance was to allow 
the DeAlbas to present additional testimony (Page 252-253 - Record 
on Appeal). Brief testimony was given, and the matter was submitted 
to the Court for decision. 
The trial Court ruling was in harmony with the requirements 
of the Lewis case, and allowed adequate opportunity fo the opposing 
party to defend. 
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CONCLUSION 
Defendants-Respondents urge that the Findings and Judgment 
of the trial Court were supported by the evidence, and that the 
amendment to the pleadings was within the sound discretion of 
the Court. It is respectfully urged that the judgment granted 
by the trial Court should be sustained. 
DATED this 24th day of April, 1985. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Brian C. Harrison 
Attorney for Defendants-
Respondents 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I mailed four copies of the foregoing 
Brief to Kenneth F. Clarke at One East Center, Suite 300, Knight 
Block Building, Provo, Utah 84601, postage prepaid this 25th 
day of April, 1985. 
Brian C. Harrisdr 
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EXHIBIT '\4* 
In the Fourth Judicial District Court < M ' L 
\%k MAR 2 0 r;i ?• 3' 
ni 
of the State of Utah 
In and For Utah County 
RICHARD WILLIAM VERHOEF AND DELORES 
ARNELL VERHOEF, HUSBAND AND W I F E A 
ET AL. 1 MINUTE ENTRY 
PUindff I 
/ CASE NUMBER 6 2 , 5 4 5 
GERARD R. ASTON AND SHARON L. AS¥0N
 D A T E D M , r r h 2 0 , q f i 4 
HUSBAND AND W I F E , ET A L . I ' 
Defendant 1 David Sam JUDGE 
This case is before the court on Plaintiff's Motion for Leave 
to File Answers to Request for Admissions, Defendants Will S. Jones, 
Clyde T. Anderson and Alpine Park Realty's Motion for Summary 
Judgment, Defendants Jared R. Aston and Sharon L. Aston's Motion 
for Summary Judgment and Defendants Zion National Title, Inc., and 
Dale C. Hallock's Motion for Summary Judgment and is considered 
pursuant to Rule 2.8, Rules of Practice of the District Courts. 
R U L I N G 
Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File Answers to Request for 
Admissions is granted. Defendants Will S. Jones, Clyde T. Anderson 
and Alpine Park Realty's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted. All 
other defendant's Motions for Summary Judgment are denied it appearing 
to the court that there are issues of fact in dispute which should 
be reserved for trial; namely, the issue of whether the conduct of 
PAGE TWO 
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any of the other defendants constitutes fraud, thus overcoming the 
merger of the provisions of the Earnest Money Agreement into the 
writings reflected in the final agreement between the parties. 
Dated this xox day of March, 1984. 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
d 
cc: Kenneth Clarke 
Brian Harrison 
1 
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7 
8 
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BRIAN C. HARRISON 
Attorney for Defendants 
290 West Center 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Telephone: 375-2500 
EXHIBIT ,,TV 
- • i ' i :,N'''t,:r.'.i 
m AUG 20 PM |; 02 
rVlLUAtfF.hJiSH^Ltfm 
(JbEPIiTV 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
RICHARD WILLIAM VERHOEF and 
DELORES ARNELL VERHOEF, |husband and wife; JACK 
MICHAEL DEALBA and EMMA 
DEALBA, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
-vs-
jGERARD R. ASTON and SHARON 
JL. ASTON, husband and wife; 
(DALE HALLOCK, an individual; 
JZIONS NATIONAL TITLE, INC., 
a Utah Corporation, 
Defendants. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 62,545 
First matter this matter having come on regularly for hearing 
|on May 21, 1984 and again on July 5, 1984, Plaintiffs being repre-
jsented by their attorney Kenneth Clarke and Defendants being rep-
resented by their attorney Brian C. Harrison, and the Court having 
received evidence from the parties and being fully advised in the 
premises, and having reviewed post-trial memorandums, and being 
fully advised in the premises, hereby enters its: 
'FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiffs have failed to sustain their burden of proof 
tLn asserting a claim against the Defendants upon which relief can 
lj 
2! 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
91 
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11 
12] 
13! 
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15 
161 
17 
18 
191 
201 
21 
22! 
23 
24 
251 
26 
27 
28 
be granted. 
2. The Uniform Real Estate Contract identified and received 
as Plaintiffs exhibit number 2 is clear, unambiguous, and binding 
between the parties. 
3. All causes of action asserted by Plaintiffs against 
Defendants should be dismissed for no cause of action. 
4. On November 25, 1980 in the County of Utah, State of Utah, 
Defendants, Aston, and Plaintiffs, Richard William Verhoef, Delores 
Arnell Verhoef, Jack Michael Dealba, and Emma Dealba, entered 
into a written contract for the purchase of certain real property, 
said contract having been identified and received as Plaintiffs 
exhibit number 2. 
5. Defendants, Gerard Aston and Sharon Aston, have at all 
times performed all the stipulations, conditions, and agreements 
stated in said contract to be performed on their part at the time 
and in the manner specified. 
6. Plaintiffs, Richard William Verhoef, Delores Arnell Ver-
hoef, Jack Michael Dealba, and Emma Dealba, have failed and refuse 
to perform the terms and conditions of the Uniform Real Estate cor 
tract in that they failed to refinance the entire unpaid balance 
on or before December 1, 1982, according to the terms of the con-
tract in question. The afore mentioned contract provided for a 
reasonable attorney's fee in the event of a breach. 
7. The damages sustained by Defendants, Gerard Aston and 
Sharon Aston, from the Plaintiffs, Richard William Verhoef, Delor 
Arnell Verhoef, Jack Michael Dealba, and Emma Dealba, as of Decen 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
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9 
10 
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12 
13 
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15 
16 
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25 
26 
27 
28 
per 1, 1982 was $67,853.00 which amount has now increased to the 
sum of $79,987.04. 
8. Defendants, Aston, have incurred attorney's fees and 
should be entitled to recover the same against the foregoing 
Plaintiffs in the sum of $3,000.00 plus costs of Court in the sum 
|of $15.00. , 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now makes its: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. All causes of action asserted by the Plaintiffs against 
the Defendants are hereby ordered dismissed for no cause of action. 
2. The Uniform Real Estate Contract identified and received 
as the Plaintiffs exhibit number 2 is clear, unambiguous, and 
|binding between the parties. 
3. Plaintiffs, Richard William Verhoef, Delores Arnell Ver-
|hoef, Jack Michael Dealba, and Emma Dealba, have breached their 
contract with the Defendants by failing to refinance the entire 
unpaid balance on or before December 1, 1982 and accordingly Defenc 
ants, Gerard Aston and Sharon Aston, are granted Judgment against 
the foregoing Plaintiffs in the sum of $79,987.04 plus interest at 
legal rate of interest from the date of Judgment until paid. 
4. Defendants, Gerard Aston and Sharon Aston, are further 
granted Judgment against the foregoing named Plaintiffs for 
attorney's fees and costs of Court incurred herein in the sum 
of $3,015.00 plus interest at the legal rate of interest from the 
date of Judgment until paid. 
1 
21 
3 I DATED this £<? * day of August, 1984. 
4II BY THE COURT: 
5|| / 
District Court Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OT MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law to Kenneth Clarke at 
1 East Center, Suite 300, P.O. Box H,Provo, Utah, 84603, 
postage prepaid, this // day of August, 1984. 
Secretary 
EXVTBTT "C m ! ! /~ iM 
u L' »hLPUNf>.STAI£uFUrAH 
'38* JUN 1,9 AH ||: 3k 
In the Fourth Judicial District C tsm HUISH. CLERK —DtPUTY 
of the State of Utah 
In and For Utah County 
MINUTE ENTBT 
RICHARD W. VERHOEF & DELORES PUintiff 
A. VERHOEF, e t a l . . , ^ ^ ^
 6 2 > 5 4 5 
DATED May 21 , 1984 
JARED R AST ON & SHARON L. o * ^ , \ David Sam JUDGE 
Reported by Richard C. T a t t o n , C.S.R. 
T R I A L 
This was the time set for trial in the above captioned matter with 
Arron Jepson and Kenneth F. Clarke appearing as counsel for plaintiffs, 
and Brian C. Harrison appearing as counsel for defendants Aston. The 
parties were present. 
Discussion between Court and counsel as to the status of Zions Title 
and Mr. Hal leek. Mr. Clarke moved to have their default entered and Court 
granted that motion. 
Mr. Clarke made an opening statement to the Court, presenting several 
documents to the Court for information purposes only. Mr. Harrison made 
his opening statement and both counsel were allowed to respond. 
Court in recess at 10:45 a.m. for twenty minutes. Court resumed in 
session with counsel and parties present. 
Counsel stated certain stipulated facts to the Court and Court 
received the stipulation. 
Mark Hathaway was sworn and questioned by Mr. Clarke on direct. 
Plaintiff's exhibit #1 - earnest money offer - marked/received. 
Plaintiff's exhibit #2 - uniform real estate contract - marked/received. 
Plaintiff's exhibit #3 - escrow instructions - marked/received. 
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Mr. Clarke moved to publish the deposition of Cynthia Brown. Motion 
was granted and then request was withdrawn. 
Mr. Hathaway was examined on further direct, cross and redirect. 
Jared Aston was sworn and questioned by Mr. Clarke as an adverse 
witness. Counsel moved to publish his deposition qnd there being no 
objection, Court ordered it published. Mr. Aston was questioned by Mr. Harrison, 
on voir dire by Mr. Clarke, further by Mr. Harrison. 
Court in recess at 12:00 noon until 1:30 p.mj 
Court resumed in session with counsel and parties present. 
Mr/Aston resumed the stand and was questioned further by Mr. Harrison. 
Defendant's exhibit #4 - settlement statement - marked/received. 
Further questioning by Mr. Clarke. 
Rebecca Coombs was sworn and examined on direct by Mr. Clarke. 
Plaintiff's exhibit #5 - printout of escrow - marked/received. 
The witness was cross-examined and excused. 
Terry Mott was sworn and examined on direct by Mr. Clarke. Counsel 
stipulated to his being an expert as to V.A. loans. He was examined on 
cross, redirect and excused. 
Delores A. Verhoef was sworn and examined on direct. 
I 
Plaintiff's exhibit #6 - 12 checks - marked/received. 
She was questioned by Mr. Harrison on cross. Counsel moved to publish 
her deposition and it was ordered published. 
Court in recess at 2:45 p.m.m until 3:05 p.m. Court resumed in session 
with counsel and parties present. 
Richard W. Verhoef was sworn and examined on direct* and cross. 
Plaintiff's exhibit #7 - disbursement summary - marked/received. 
Plaintiff's exhibit #8 - contract schedule at 12% - marked/received. 
Arron Jepson was sworn and testified as to plaintiff's attorney's fees 
and was cross-examined. 
Kenneth H. Clarke was sworn and testified as to attorney's fees. 
Mr. Harrison moved to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint on the grounds 
that there has been no allegation of fraud established. Court indicated it 
finds that fraud has not been established, but did not order the complaint 
dismissed. 
Court in recess at 3:40 p.m. until 4:15 p.m. Court resumed in session with 
counsel andparties present. 
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Mr. Harrison moved to amend defendant's counterclaim to add the 
DeAlbas as defendants to the counterclaim. Mr. Clarke responded. Court 
granted the motion, but indicated Mr. Clarke may have time to respond in 
their behalf. Court will allow Mr. Clarke to submit a brief to the Court 
by tomorrow if he desires. Court also indicated that at this point the 
Court's ruling on the case will not apply to them until they have had time 
to respond. Court indicated it may have counsel submit closing arguments 
in brief form and Mr. Clarke may use that time period to determine if he 
wishes to present further evidence in behalf of the DeAlbas. 
Court in recess at 4:20 p.m. | 
May 22, 1984 - Court resumed in session at 1:30 p.m. with counsel and parties 
present. | 
Mr. Clarke presented the Court with several relevant cases and stated 
his arguments as to the Court's decision regarding DeAlbas. Mr. Harrison 
responded. Court indicated it will examine the cases on the next recess 
and make a ruling. 
Jared R. Aston was recalled and examined on direct, and on cross. 
Brian C. Harrison was sworn and testified as to his attorney's fees. 
Wil Scott Jones was sworn and examined on direct and cross. 
Mr. Harrison proffered a pay-off figure to the Court and Court accepted 
that figure, subject to verification by Mr. Clarke. 
Richard W. Verhoef resumed the stand and was questioned by Mr. Harrison. 
Jared R. Aston was recalled and examined on further direct and voir dire 
by Mr. Clarke. 
Plaintiff's exhibit #9 - Zions' Title letter - marked/received over objection 
Defendant rests. No rebuttal. 
Court indicated it will allow counsel to submit their closing arguments 
in brief form. Mr. Clarke also requested he be allowed to submit motions and 
the Court stated it would consider them if they are appropriate. Court recessed 
at 2:15 p.m. Court resumed in session at 2:25 p.m. with counsel and parties 
present. 
Court indicated it had examined the authorities submitted by Mr. Clarke 
but will not change the ruling as to defendant's motion to amend as to DeAlbas. 
Court will allow Mr. Clarke twenty days to raise any additional matters in their 
behalf, and will allow Mr. Harrison to present surrebuttal if he desires. 
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If Mr. Clarke does not file his motion to present rebuttal evidence, 
he then has ten days thereafter to present his closing arguments in brief 
form and Mr. Harrison may have five days to respond and Mr. Clarke five 
days for further response. The Court would then make its ruling. 
Court adjourned. 
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FURTHER HEARING 
This matter came before the Court for hearing with Ken Clarke appearing 
as counsel forthe plaintiff and Brian Harrison appearing as counsel for the 
defendant. Court allowed this matter to come before the Court for hearing 
further evidence as to the defendants DeAlba. 
Mr. Harrison stated his objections to the testimony of the potential 
witness and there was discussion between Court and counsel. Court will allow 
the witness to be called. 
Joyce W. Clark was sworn and examined on direct by Mr. Clarke and 
on cross. The witness was excused. 
Court allowed Mr. Clarke ten days to submit his closing arguments in 
writing, with five days for Brian to respond and five days for Mr. Clarke's 
rebuttal. The Court will keep the matter under advisement. 
